quarter economic growth over 2.5% (annualized), seven in-party candidates won and only two lost. All four of the in-party candidates who ran with weaker second-quarter economies lost.
Although ballots were still being counted more than 2 weeks after the election, it appears that Gore in fact received about 50.3% of the national two-party popular vote. The forecast overpredicted Gore's share of the two-party vote by 2.5 percentage points. This error is larger than the mean absolute error of out-of-sample forecasts of 1.5 percentage points but well within the historical range of out-of-sample errors for the model. Three out-of-sample errors (for 1952, 1956, and 1996) were larger than this year's error (Campbell, 2000b, p. 37) . Considering that the polls at the time of the election were off by a percentage point and that the unanticipated aspects of the campaigns make some difference, the forecast error was within the acceptable range. Still, recognizing that (a) one should not expect zero error in a presidential forecast because the forecasts are based on imperfect poll and economic data and that (b) the campaigns take unforeseeable turns that may affect voters in ways that the models cannot anticipate ahead of time, it would be advisable to learn what we can from this election and strengthen the model if possible.
To the extent that the trial-heat and economy model was in error this year, why was it? There are two ingredients in the model: the polls and the economy. Although there are reasons to be increasingly wary of the polls, with extraordinary volatility owing to dubious methods of determining who are likely voters, the polls this year were not a problem for the forecast. The polls alone would actually have produced a very accurate forecast this year. 1 Also, as Table 1 demonstrates, the model applied at later stages in the campaign gave increasing weight to the polls, gave decreasing weight to the economy, and became increasingly accurate in this year's election. The October and November timings of the model, depending less on the economy and more on the polls, were quite accurate.
Because the Labor Day forecast for Gore was based largely on the economy, the problem of overpredicting the Gore vote is most likely related to the economy. Either the model overestimated the impact of the economy (as measured), or the unanticipated aspects of the campaign offset the economic tide anticipated to favor Gore.
2 My guess is that both are true. Elections without an incumbent in the race are less of a referendum on the in-party's performance than elections with an incumbent running. Voters may be more inclined to focus credit or blame personally on the incumbent president than a would-be successor of the president's party.
In addition, in this particular race, the in-party candidate (Gore) failed to run a retrospective campaign emphasizing the credit that the in-party should receive because of the economy. The model anticipates that candidates acting in their own self-interest in the campaign will convert a good economy into votes. They will take credit or place blame. Candidates do not automatically receive credit or blame for economic conditions; they must convince voters to grant the credit or place the blame, and this was not done in this campaign. In short, though the model's error is well within the bounds of its record, there is enough error to be shared between the model and Gore.
Campbell / EVALUATING THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE 291 Although two sources of error seem likely, there is greater justification for the model to make its specification error than for Gore to have made his campaigning error. Because of the unavailability of polling data for earlier elections, the estimation of the trial-heat and economy model is based on data from elections since 1948. Before this year's election, only 4 of these 13 prior elections were open-seat contests (1952, 1960, 1968, and 1988) . Because of the few cases involved, a variant of the Labor Day model that included an interaction term (the economy with whether an incumbent was running) was indistinguishable from the simple additive model. The interaction term did not improve the model's fit (was not statistically significant) even after the 2000 election was included in the analysis.
The problem of determining from an aggregate analysis whether an in-party candidate who is not the incumbent is accorded by voters with full credit, half credit, or no credit for the economy is evident in Table 2 . The first set of three equations in Table 2 does not include the 2000 election, and the second set includes 2000. The first equation in each set is the original trial-heat and economy equation. The second and third equations take into account whether the in-party candidate is the incumbent through an interaction term with the economic variable. The second equation in each set assumes that a nonincumbent of the in-party (a successor candidate) receives half the credit (or blame) that an incumbent would receive. The economic variable is multiplied by 0.5 for nonincumbents of the in-party and 1 if the in-party candidate is the incumbent. The third equation assumes that a nonincumbent is not given credit or blame for the economy. In this equation, the economic variable is multiplied by zero for nonincumbents of the in-party and 1 if the in-party candidate is the incumbent.
As the goodness-of-fit measures indicate, there is little to choose from in these three specifications of how economic conditions are attributed to nonincumbents. All three versions of the model, whether 2000 is included or excluded, are about equally strong. The version that produced the most accurate forecast for this year's election (the no-effect version) is based on an assumption that successor candidates receive no credit or blame for how their party handled the economy (apart from that already incorporated into their poll numbers). However, this is only one case and could as easily be explained by the peculiarity of the Gore campaign as anything else. The most plausible variants of the The coefficients in parentheses are t ratios. To estimate the half-effect attribution, the GDP variable was multiplied by 0.5 when the in-party candidate was not an incumbent (1952, 1960, 1968, and 1988 ) and 1 otherwise. To estimate the no-effect attribution, the GDP variable was multiplied by 0 when the in-party candidate was not an incumbent (1952, 1960, 1968, and 1988) and 1 otherwise. A model with both an additive and interaction term (the economy with whether an incumbent was running) was also estimated. The coefficients were 1.16 for the additive GDP term and 1.28 for the interaction term, but because of the small number of cases, neither was statistically significant. 293 model would seem to be the original version or the half-effects version. The half-effects version is just as strong or slightly stronger in terms of the goodness of fit and would have reduced the error this year to about the average out-of-sample error. Table 3 presents the out-of-sample errors for the original full-effect and the half-effect versions of the trial-heat and economy model. Again, there is no clear winner between these two versions. The original version of the model has a slightly smaller mean absolute error but has a slightly higher standard deviation of errors. Of the 14 elections, the full attribution (original) version produced smaller errors in 8 elections, and the half-effects version produced smaller errors in 6 elec- 
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